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detachments may not accurately reflect the way in which the Army fights. After conducting a DOTMLPF analysis, the author recommends updating Army doctrine to reflect the current rear detachment mission and organization, as well as recommending that the Army establish a small Tables of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) for rear detachments to improve collective training and mission execution.
REAR DETACHMENTS: CAPTURING AND RESOURCING HOW THE ARMY FIGHTS
When an Army brigade or battalion size unit deploys, the unit's commander relies on an un-resourced, ad-hoc organization to maintain the important connection among the unit's home installation, the unit's family members, and the deployed unit: the rear detachment. Given the family oriented mission of the rear detachment, one would expect the Army to prioritize the manning and training of this organization. But in practice, the rear detachment is organized without tables of distribution and allowances (TDA), does not have substantive doctrine to guide its formation and operation, and generally organizes late in the ARFORGEN cycle which prevents the rear detachment from conducting effective collective training. Based on one of the Army Family Covenant's themes that the strength of Soldiers is their families 1 , an organization that provides a significant connection between families and their Soldiers would apparently be fairly important, but the current lack of doctrinal standards, the lack of a standard organizational structure, or a resourced personnel manning plan for rear detachments indicates otherwise.
Despite the inconsistencies noted above, every deploying brigade and battalion will form, train, and employ a rear detachment in support of deployed operations and, more importantly, any commander who tried to deploy without forming a rear detachment would most likely find themselves no longer in command. Clearly, rear detachments are, in practice, very important. Given this importance, how should today's Army implement policy to formally capture how these critical organizations are manned, trained, and employed? This question is particularly pertinent and relevant in the current environment of strategic mission refinement as the Army is looking to reduce force structure and restructure the remaining units. With potential changes in how brigade combat teams (BCTs) are organized, there may develop a window of opportunity to make some changes in force structure and codify important lessons learned about rear detachments from the past twenty years of Army operations.
The significance of rear detachments, the emphasis placed on rear detachments by leaders at all echelons, and the value of the rear detachment to its Soldiers and their families is not a new discovery for the Army of the 21st Century. Since 1990, and before, when the Army deployed in support of OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM Army units have formed and operated rear detachments. Although the Army had used rear detachments previously for mission and training deployments, the changed demographic of the Army made the formation of rear detachments a very important factor for the units that deployed to Southwest Asia, as more Soldiers were married and had children than in any previous conflict. 2 Formation of these rear detachments, selection of the rear detachment leaders, and maintaining the rear detachment mission during the six to nine months of deployment challenged company and field grade leaders at the battalion and brigade level. 3 One of the major initial challenges leaders encountered was the lack of formal guidance about rear detachments.
In 1992, Army Major Deborah R. Godwin wrote a thesis entitled "The Mission, Moving forward in time, the importance of and challenges associated with rear detachments remained. As part of the after action review process for operations in Bosnia, the U.S. Army War College undertook a personal experience monograph collection study. The following is one of the conclusions made by the editor:
We have a married Army. A major consequence is that the most important position in a deploying unit, after the commander (and arguably after the operations/ plans officer), is the Rear Detachment Commander. Captain Basil H. Liddell-Hart was correct in noting that "even the bonds of patriotism, discipline, and comradeship are loosened when the family itself is threatened." The state of morale on the home front underpins that on the operational front. 6 Even over the past ten years of conflict, the topic of rear detachments is one that is common to Army professional journals as leaders at company, battalion, and brigade struggle with meeting the challenges created in forming rear detachments while simultaneously preparing Soldiers, units, and families for deployment. 7 Other than lessons learned and the capturing of organizational knowledge through after action reviews and handbooks, not much has changed in terms of meeting the doctrinal shortcomings identified by Godwin and Dyer. This paper will examine how the Army has done in developing rear detachment guidance for company and field grade leaders in the twenty years since LTC Dyer and MAJ Godwin made their observations, determine whether that guidance is adequate to today's requirements, and make recommendations based on that assessment.
The focus for this paper will be at the brigade, battalion, and company level in the …Upon deployment the rear detachment commander (RDC) assumes the duties of the unit commander and maintains regular contact with the unit commander at the deployed mission site…. The RDC is responsible for the administrative operations of the rear detachment, including maintaining command and control, accounting for unit property and equipment, and managing personnel…. One of the most important rear detachment duties, however, is serving as a vital communications link between the deployed unit and family members….to help families solve their problems at the lowest level. 19 Although longer than the mission found in FM 7-15, the handbook provides similar guideposts to units about the organizing of and mission for rear detachments.
The intended audience for the handbook is for Soldiers selected to serve as rear detachment commanders vice a standard for the Army that establishes a doctrinal role and mission for rear detachments. Although the handbook provides useful information to rear detachment commanders, the handbook should supplement doctrine, not substitute for it.
In addition to FM 7-15 and the Commander's Handbook, several Army regulations provide information that shapes the role and mission of the rear detachment.
First among these is AR 600-20, Army Command Policy, which directs commanders to support the Total Army Family Program which includes the establishment and use of FRGs. 20 The second regulation is AR 608-1, Army Community Service Center, which describes the interaction of the rear detachment with the installation and the FRG in regards to the family support mission:
Preplanning for Family assistance will ensure that a comprehensive, realistic, effective and coordinated assistance delivery system is in place prior to military operations. This system will normally include the triad of Family assistance centers, unit FRG, and unit rear detachments.
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AR 608-1 further describes the role of the rear detachment commander:
The rear detachment commander is the unit commander's representative at home station while the unit is deployed and is the FRG link to the deployed unit. All logistic support for FRG (for example, meeting rooms, nontactical vehicle use, office equipment and computers, newsletters, telephones, and volunteer support) is authorized by the rear detachment commander during deployment.
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The two regulations, coupled with FM 7-15, establish family support as one of the missions for the rear detachment. Although this mission is not clearly described in doctrine, current unit rear detachment operations clearly demonstrate an understanding of the need for and the mission of rear detachments in regards to family support.
Organization. AR 5-22 defines organization as:
An organization is a unit or element with varied functions enabled by a structure through which individuals cooperate systematically to accomplish a common mission and directly provide or support warfighting capabilities. Subordinate units/elements coordinate with other units/elements and, as a whole, enable the higher-level unit/element to accomplish its mission. This includes the manpower (military, civilian, and contractor support) required to operate, sustain, and reconstitute warfighting capabilities. maintain accountability of equipment that did not deploy with the unit. 27 The literature leads to the conclusion that there is a common understanding of how rear detachments should organize to meet the mission and this common understanding should drive any update to current doctrine. The two major challenges with the organization are in how to, and with whom to, staff the rear detachments. The paper will address this personnel issue in follow-on analysis. to rear detachment training are: train as you will fight, train while operating, and conduct multi-echelon and concurrent training. 31 The Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)
process makes the application of these three principles challenging for unit leaders.
Although no single database exists that specifically addresses rear detachment training, multiple unit After Action Reviews (AARs) and unit lesson learned articles identify the challenges associated with training rear detachments. 32 Specifically during the reset stage, units are not fully manned and are primarily focused on equipment.
During the train/ready phase units are focused on individual and collective training, but the tactical training for deployment takes priority over organizing and training rear detachments. In the cases researched, units formed and assigned personnel to rear detachments prior to the units combat training center (CTC) mission rehearsal exercise (MRE) prior to deployment and used that deployment as the single training event for rear detachments. In a few cases, the rear detachment personnel, to include battalion or brigade level rear detachment commanders, changed prior to the unit's deployment. 33 Based on the training analysis, collective training for rear detachments is an area that may need improvement.
Materiel. AR 5-22 defines materiel as follows:
All items (including ships, tanks, self-propelled weapons, aircraft, and so forth, and related spares, repair parts, and support equipment but excluding real property, installations, and utilities) necessary to equip, operate, maintain, and support military activities without distinction as to its application for administrative or combat purposes. The AFSB, in most cases, takes responsibility for LBE accountability and maintenance.
Whether or not the AFSB continues this mission for theater security training missions as the Army withdraws from Afghanistan may impact materiel readiness. Officers selected for rear detachment command are products of the leadership development process through the three training domains of the institution, the unit, and the individual. 37 Based on the review of AARs, lessons learned, and articles written on rear detachments, the leaders selected appeared to perform no better or worse than leaders of the same rank within the organization. However, most battalion and brigade commanders emphasized that selecting the rear detachment commander was one of their most important decisions prior to the deployment. Although not specifically stated, the implication was that the leader development process provided a sufficient number of officers at battalion and brigade level who were capable of leading the rear detachment for those organizations.
In addition to the above analysis, general officers have also emphasized the importance of selecting quality leaders for rear detachments. An example of this guidance was given by General William W. Crouch, U.S. Army Europe Commander during the initial deployments to Bosnia in (year): "he insisted that deploying commanders leave high quality officers behind to command rear detachments." 38 Additionally, General Crouch sought to ensure that the officers selected for rear detachment command were seen in the same light by the Army:
He [Crouch] sought agreement from the Army Chief of Staff, which he received, that subsequent promotion boards would be instructed to consider an officer's selection for rear detachment command as an acknowledgement of his high quality rather than the reverse. 39 Whether or not rear detachment command has helped or hindered officers for promotion is difficult to determine based on the available data, but the data does show that the Army's leader development system provided a pool capable of leaders from which to select rear detachment commanders at the brigade and battalion level.
Personnel. AR 5-22 describes personnel as "the development of manpower and personnel plans, programs, and policies necessary to man, support and sustain the Army." 40 The major challenge with rear detachments as currently executed in the U.S.
Army is that the organizations are ad hoc and the burden for manning is put on the deploying unit without the support of a TDA. This aspect of rear detachment manning is further complicated by the issue of unit deployability status. General guidance for brigade combat teams has been to deploy at a minimum of 95% of authorized strength.
Although unit manning has exceeded authorized strength by several percent, Soldiers who are non-deployable effect the ability of the unit to meet the deployed manning goal and manning rear detachments with deployable Soldiers further exacerbates meeting this challenge. 41 Based on the current personnel manning system, deploying unit commanders must balance the selection of quality leaders and Soldiers with the requirement to meet ARFORGEN deployment manning requirements. The manning policy for deployment logically causes deploying commanders to think carefully about manning rear detachments with leaders and Soldiers who would otherwise be deployable and creates a tension for deploying leaders when searching for the best leaders for the rear detachment.
Facilities. AR 5-22 defines real property as consisting of "one or more of the following: a building, a structure, a utility system, pavement, and underlying land." 42 Similar to materiel, facilities for rear detachments are not an issue that is raised in afteraction reviews, other than maintaining accountability of the real property. In an expeditionary Army, where units will deploy and then redeploy to same duty station, this does not seem have the potential of becoming a systemic problem.
Summary of DOTMLPF Analysis. Based on the analysis, the aspects of DOTMLPF that do not require change are individual training, materiel, leader development and education, and facilities. The four areas that do require some change are doctrine, organization, collective training, and personnel. In terms of doctrine and organizational structure for rear detachments there is sufficient information that resides in handbooks and lessons learned documents to inform the necessary changes to current doctrinal manuals. Collective training for rear detachments is a function of the ARFORGEN cycle and current personnel manning policies. Without changes to personnel manning, collective training of rear detachments would require commanders to prioritize rear detachment training and manning earlier in the ARFORGEN cycle. The recommendation section will provide methods for updating doctrine and provide two courses of action for changing personnel manning.
Recommendations
The DOTMLPF analysis provides a framework to address the shortcomings in the aspects of doctrine, organizations, collective training, and personnel. Of these, the most pressing need is to address the doctrinal shortcoming and then consider the options and logical outcomes in the other three areas of organization, collective training and personnel.
For the past twenty years, Army units at all echelons have organized and operated rear detachments to maintain contact with family members and provide a mission command element to coordinate among the deployed unit, installation staff, and 1-78. Campaigning requires a mindset and vision that complements expeditionary requirements. Soldiers understand that no matter how long they are deployed, the Army will take care of them and take care of their families through the employment of rear detachments. They are confident that the loyalty they pledge to their units will be returned to them, no matter what happens on the battlefield or in what condition they return home. Tactical leaders understand the effects of protracted land operations on Soldiers and adjust the tempo of operations whenever circumstances allow. Senior commanders plan effective campaigns and major operations. They provide the resources needed to sustain operations, often through the imaginative use of joint capabilities. 44 Finally, the USAAGS should update Article 1.1.4 to reflect the mission described in the analysis and make the organization described in the U. Once the doctrine is updated and the organizational structure is captured in FM 7-15, the remaining issues are the collective training of and personnel manning for rear detachments. This paper considers two options and recommends the establishment of a rear detachment TDA.
First Option -No Change. The first, and most obvious, choice is to leave the situation as it is. Despite multiple AAR comments and obvious friction, the system works and will probably continue to work. The question is whether or not changes in the Army's system for forming rear detachments would help leaders at brigade level and below address the requirements, formal and informal, of the rear detachment. The
Army is better at forming and operating rear detachments than it was in 1991, but is the Army as good as it can be in establishing and operating rear detachments? If the answer is yes, then there is no requirement to change.
Not changing the personnel manning would also probably lead to no change in the collective training process for the rear detachment, although deploying unit commanders could prioritize rear detachment manning and training over other training, but this may create an unacceptable impact on mission training for the part of the unit that is deploying.
Second Option -Add Organizational TDA Structure at the Brigade and Battalion
Level. In accordance with the recommended changes to FM 7-15 and as part of the Army's reorganization of BCTs, provide the rear detachment structure as either a permanent TDA or as an augmented TDA synchronized with the ARFORGEN cycle.
Either the permanent or augmented TDA would drive the collective training process. A permanent TDA would provide the commander maximum flexibility to train over the ARFORGEN cycle; an augmented TDA synchronized with the ARFORGEN cycle would provide the commander a predictable window in which to conduct the collective training.
In addition to the training benefit, a TDA would provide relief from the deployable non deployable selection dilemma described in the analysis section. Soldiers assigned against the TDA would not affect the deployment numbers. Additionally, battalion and brigade commanders would be able to consider deployability secondarily to selecting the most capable leaders and Soldiers.
The major challenge with the TDA is the personnel cost for the Army. If the TDA at brigade were to have a rear detachment commander (RDC), a rear detachment NCOIC, a rear detachment S1, and a rear detachment S4, and the battalions were to have a RDC and a rear detachment NCOIC as the standing members, the personnel cost for a six battalion BCT would be 16 personnel. With the projected number of deployable BCTs and BDEs, the cost of providing this TDA to every deployable unit would most likely exceed 2,000 Soldiers, which some will equate to a lost unit of one type or another. 48 However, providing deploying units with a standing or augmented TDA provides a further commitment to families, provides flexibility to commanders in selecting rear detachment leadership, and provides a very small cadre of leaders who can focus on training rear detachments. The sooner in the ARFORGEN cycle the unit mans the TDA, the more effective the rear detachment will become at accomplishing the FRG support mission, the materiel mission, and the non-deployable Soldier accountability mission. Fundamentally, a rear detachment will not get better at tasks on which they do not train, on which they train infrequently, or on which they train only once during a major training exercise prior to deployment. A standing TDA or an augmented TDA will allow units more time to train as they will fight and to get better at their mission.
Conclusion
AR 71-9, Warfighting Capabilities Determination, states that "the Army utilizes DOTMLPF in training, readiness, and accountability of current organizations, and in changing Army organizations themselves to be more mission capable and versatile."
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By updating Army doctrine for rear detachments and changing the manner in which rear detachments are manned, the Army will make the rear detachment more capable.
Additionally, these changes will better reflect how rear detachments support the expeditionary nature of our brigade combat formations and the Army will capture one of the important principles that has guided tactical unit deployment for the past twenty we do is take care of Soldiers, Civilians and Families." 51 Developing the doctrine for rear detachments and, just as importantly, providing a personnel policy for manning rear 47 Reorganized tasks to match missions. Updated task 07 to match current regulations (change from FSG to FRG). 48 Rough estimate based on current force structure of 45 BCTs, 38 functional support brigades, and 45 functional brigades (129 deployable brigades x 16 = 2064). 16 is based on six battalions for each brigade and the 129 brigades is based on current force structure. With reduced force structure this number would be lower. Additionally, if the TDA were an augmented TDA based on deployment schedules, number could be 2/3 or 1/2 this number based on deployment schedules. 
